Analysis: Unraveling the Effects of Trump’s Syria Policy

By Luke MouracadeIn a press secretary statement released October 6, the White House announced President Trump’s decision, apparently made during a phone call with President Erdogan of Turkey, to pull US troops from Northern Syria and allow Turkey to carry out military operations in the region. The directive blindsided the Pentagon, the intelligence community, and Kurdish forces, who until recently were the United States’ closest allies in the fight against ISIS. In the more than 2 weeks that have followed, brutal violence has unfolded, Turkey and the US have negotiated a 5 day ceasefire, and the geopolitical situation has changed entirely. The ramifications of the decision are wide-ranging and not always quantifiable. In addition to immediate humanitarian concerns caused by the policy, the United States has certainly lost geopolitical capital in northern Syria, valuable intelligence capabilities, and trust from allies across the Middle East. In recent years, the fight against ISIS has been a high priority for US national security. In lieu of waging a traditional war, the US opted for a different strategy, sparing the heavy monetary and human cost of putting tens of thousands of troops in Syria. The US decided to aid the Kurds, who, allied with several other groups to form the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have been the primary actors on the ground in the conflict with ISIS. US troops supplied training, intelligence, air strikes, and a small number of special forces troops designed to greatly improve the SDF’s fighting capacity. Throughout the conflict, as the SDF has pushed back ISIS and diminished the terrorist organization’s land holdings to almost nothing, they have taken over a wide swath of territory in northern Syria for themselves. Turkey, who views Kurdish militias as a terrorism threat with ties to the PKK (a Kurdish organization within Turkey also labeled a terrorist organization), has not been fond of The US-Kurdish alliance. To Erdogan, the formation of a de facto Kurdish state directly across from the Turkish border poses a major threat, both politically and, perhaps to a lesser extent, militarily. After receiving the green light from Trump to move into northern Syria, a potentially devastating humanitarian crisis began to unfold: at least 130,000 fearful Kurdish civilians fled their homes, and dozens of Kurdish troops were killed by Turkish forces in just a matter of days. This period of chaos continued until October 17th, when a 5 day ceasefire deal was announced between Turkey, the US, and the Kurds. The ceasefire, though imperfect and unclear, has thus far staved off the genocide so many international observers feared was coming, even after the 5 day period came to an end on October 22nd. As US troops have packed up their bases and moved out of northern Syria, Kurdish forces made a decision they deemed necessary for survival - embracing Assad’s government as a new ally. The Kurds have not completely abandoned hope that the US will remain a partner, but they need partners on the ground if they are to withstand a Turkish invasion. This geopolitical shift is important for a few reasons. Assad is aligned with both Russia and Iran, major geopolitical rivals of the US. Any foothold they have in the region poses a threat to US interests, as it gives the countries more power and allows them to influence the region more directly. However, the shift poses more direct and practical challenges to the US as well. The SDF has been fighting alongside US special forces for years, and have therefore gained access to a wide range of intelligence that could now fall into the hands of Assad, Russia, and Iran. According to Eric L. Robinson of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Kurds’ choice to seek security from Assad’s government will result in them “be[ing] forced to give up TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures], names, locations, etc.” This could be a boon for Russian and Iranian intelligence on how US special forces operate. Lastly, and most significantly, Kurdish forces held roughly 10,000 captured ISIS fighters in prisons across Syria prior to October. As US troops retreated, Kurdish forces abandoned these prisons to defend against the coming Turkish offensive. US drones and surveillance technology, normally used to support the SDF and supply intelligence, shifted to clear travel routes for US troops, leaving Kurds (and their prisons) even more vulnerable. As a final blow to the security of the ISIS prisons, Turkish Supported Opposition (TSO) forces, many of which have extremist ties of their own, attacked Kurdish troops and possibly freed many of the former ISIS fighters. The freeing of ISIS prisoners in and of itself is absolutely disastrous. Any former member of ISIS could potentially supply vital information, and many of the captives, particularly those who were recently captured, had not yet been interrogated. “Most of the people we interviewed got disillusioned by ISIS,” said Anne Speckhard, director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, reacting to the escape of ISIS fighters. “We’re just losing a goldmine of data.” The loss of potential information on ISIS commanders, strategies, recruitment, etc. have all been lost. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, has also already called on the freed prisoners to return and continue fighting. One can only imagine the effects should many of the prisoners return to the battlefield. Hardened veterans of the fight in Syria, they would breath a fresh breath of air into ISIS just as US troops pull out of the region.Lastly, Trump’s Syria policy has prompted candidly negative statements and reactions from key US allies in the Middle East. Uncharacteristically, a Saudi diplomat criticized US foreign policy, calling the decision a “disaster for the region.” Likewise, headlines in Yediot Ahronot, a widely read Israeli daily news publication, ran headlines that included “The Next Betrayal” and “A Knife in our Back.” If the US is willing to withdraw support from the Kurds, what’s to keep President Trump from backing away from other alliances? This is the question many American allies are currently asking themselves. Again, the total effects of Trump’s decision are impossible to quantify. Between humanitarian, geopolitical, and intelligence concerns, the removal of troops has lit too many fires to count, let alone put out. President Trump has managed to endanger a US ally, embolden ISIS, create an opening for Assad, Russia, and Iran, and weaken the already shaky faith of other US partners in US policy in the Middle East. As US troops left their Kurdish counterparts behind, some of them confessed to feeling shame, with one Army officer calling the retreat “a stain on the American conscience.” Indeed, it’s difficult to find anyone in the US foreign policy establishment who approves of the President’s decision. In recent days, there’s been bipartisan talk in Congress of efforts to mitigate the Syria policy, through sanctions, or moving the troops to Iraq, or some other last ditch effort to lessen the policy’s effects. However, just today, the Trump administration announced the repeal of sanctions levied on Turkey. Trump’s “America First” philosophy has never been more real. Bibliography

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